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Under the Second Amendment
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In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court’s
landmark Second Amendment case, the Court held that the
right to bear arms is an individual right aimed at self-defense in the home. Two years later, McDonald v. City of Chicago extended this right to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. However, lower courts were left with little guidance on what level of scrutiny to apply to gun regulations.
As a result, courts have applied various levels of scrutiny
including intermediate scrutiny, strict scrutiny, a two-step
inquiry that leads to either intermediate or strict scrutiny,
and an undue burden standard. Of these, courts seem to favor the hybrid two-step test.
This Comment will propose a more comprehensive and
workable method to determine what standard of review to
apply to gun regulations—the circle model used in the context of church autonomy and freedom of religion protected
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by the First Amendment. This model advocates an epicenter
comprised of a core right that has two concentric circles revolving around the epicenter. The farther away one moves
from the core, the fewer rights one has and the less scrutiny
should be applied to any regulations falling within those circles. The circle model would provide guidance on what level
of scrutiny to apply to regulations depending on where in
this model they fall. This Comment will concentrate specifically on the “who.” The Author will demonstrate how to apply this model to different types of individuals to determine
where in this model these individuals fall and thus what level
of scrutiny to apply to regulations targeting them.
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INTRODUCTION
“At 2:09 a.m., a warning appeared on the club’s Facebook page:
‘Everyone get out of pulse and keep running.’”1 It was Latin night
at Pulse, a gay nightclub, and what should have been a night full of
spirited salsa dancing turned into a deadly nightmare.2 Omar Mateen, who called 911 during the attack to pledge allegiance to ISIS,3
opened fire at the Orlando nightclub on June 12, 2016, between 2:02
AM and 5:15 AM,4 killing forty-nine people and wounding fiftythree.5 Individuals locked themselves in bathroom stalls and played
dead while waiting for the police to arrive.6 One survivor, Angel
Colon, who was shot three times in the leg, miraculously stayed silent as Mateen continued to shoot his hand and hip.7 Those trapped
inside the club frantically called and messaged friends and relatives.8 Mateen legally purchased the two weapons he used at Pulse
the week before the shooting.9 This horrific attack marks “the deadliest mass shooting in the United States.”10

1

Ariel Zambelich, 3 Hours in Orlando: Piecing Together an Attack and Its
Aftermath, NPR: THE TWO-WAY (June 26, 2016, 5:09 PM), http://www.npr.org/
2016/06/16/482322488/orlando-shooting-what-happened-update.
2
Id.
3
Ralph Ellis et al., Orlando Shooting: 49 Killed, Shooter Pledged ISIS Allegiance, CNN (June 13, 2016, 11:05 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/06/12/us/orlando-nightclub-shooting/.
4
Zambelich, supra note 1.
5
Id.; Ellis, supra note 3.
6
Jack Healy & John Eligon, Orlando Survivors Recall Night of Terror:
‘Then He Shoots Me Again’, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2016), http://www.nytimes.
com/2016/06/18/us/pulse-nightclub-orlando-mass-shooting.html?rref=collection
%2Fnewseventcollection%2F2016-orlando-shooting&action=click&contentCollection=us&region=rank&module=package&version=highlights&contentPlacement=2&pgtype=collection&_r=0.
7
Id.
8
Id.; Ellis, supra note 3.
9
Zambelich, supra note 1.
10
Ellis, supra note 3; Zambelich, supra note 1. It should be noted that over
the course of writing this paper, I had to rewrite the introductory paragraph several
times due to the number of mass shootings in America that took place over the
span of a few months. I wanted to open with the most recent American shooting,
and unfortunately, the difficulty in staying current sheds light on the terrible reality of the frequency of mass shootings.
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In District of Columbia v. Heller,11 the Supreme Court’s landmark Second Amendment case, the Court held that the right to bear
arms is an individual right aimed at self-defense in the home.12 Two
years later, McDonald v. City of Chicago13 extended this right to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment.14 However, after Heller
and McDonald, many questions were left unanswered, such as “‘the
scope of [the Heller] right beyond the home15 and the standards for
determining whether and how the right can be burdened by governmental regulation.’”16 Heller did state, however, that the right to
bear arms is not absolute and many longstanding handgun regulations are “presumptively lawful.”17 It is no surprise that after
these decisions some would advocate for stricter gun regulations,18
11

554 U.S. 570 (2008).
Id. at 635.
13
561 U.S. 742 (2010).
14
Id. at 750 (“We have previously held that most of the provisions of the Bill
of Rights apply with full force to both the Federal Government and the States.
Applying the standard that is well established in our case law, we hold that the
Second Amendment right is fully applicable to the States.”).
15
See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 935–36, 940 (7th Cir. 2012) (“Nor
can we ignore the implication of the analysis that the constitutional right of armed
self-defense is broader than the right to have a gun in one’s home.”); Kachalsky
v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 94 (2d Cir. 2012) (recognizing that regulating the carrying of a firearm in public did implicate the Second Amendment,
but that it did not burden the core right of self-defense in the home—a “critical
difference” between this case and Heller because the government’s authority to
regulate handguns “is qualitatively different in public than in the home”). But see
Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 875–76 (4th Cir. 2013) (declining to decide
whether the Second Amendment protections apply outside the home).
16
Woollard, 712 F.3d at 874 (quoting United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d
458, 467 (4th Cir. 2011)); see Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 89 (“What we know from
[Heller and McDonald] is that Second Amendment guarantees are at their zenith
within the home. What we do not know is the scope of that right beyond the home
and the standards for determining when and how the right can be regulated by a
government.”) (citation omitted).
17
554 U.S. at 627 n.26.
18
Max Ehrenfreund & Zachary A. Goldfarb, 11 Essential Facts About Guns
and Mass Shootings in the United States, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (June 18,
2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonkblog/wp/2015/06/18/11-essential-facts-about-guns-and-mass-shootings-in-the-united-states/ (Many Americans support the right to bear arms as well as specific restrictions, such as background checks, assault weapons bans, and a federal database to track guns. Fiftyeight percent of Americans said they favored stricter gun control laws in a 2012
12
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especially in light of the large number of mass shootings in America
in 2016 alone19––such as the one in Orlando described above.
Amid this confusion, courts and commentators have struggled to
grapple with what level of scrutiny to apply to gun regulations.
Courts are split on this issue and have applied various levels of scrutiny to determine whether gun regulations pass constitutional muster.20 These levels of scrutiny range from intermediate scrutiny to
strict scrutiny, to a two-step inquiry that leads to either intermediate
or strict scrutiny, to an undue burden standard.21 Of these, courts
seem to favor the hybrid two-step test.22
In order to provide courts with a more comprehensive and workable method to determine what standard of review to apply to gun
regulations, the circle model used in the context of church autonomy
and freedom of religion protected by the First Amendment should
Gallup poll following a school shooting in Newton, Connecticut). But see Art
Swift, Less Than Half of Americans Support Stricter Gun Laws, GALLUP (Oct. 31,
2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/179045/less-half-americans-support-strictergun-laws.aspx (forty-seven percent of Americans said they favored stricter gun
control laws in a 2014 Gallup poll).
19
Mass Shootings - 2016, GUN VIOLENCE ARCHIVE, http://www.gunviolencearchive.org/reports/mass-shooting (last visited Dec. 27, 2016).
20
See Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 194 (5th Cir. 2012); GeorgiaCarry.Org., Inc.
v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1260 n.34 (11th Cir. 2012); United States v. Greeno,
679 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2012); Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244,
1252 (D.C. Cir. 2011) [hereinafter Heller II]; Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d
684, 701–04 (7th Cir. 2011); Nordyke v. King, 644 F.3d 776, 782–84, 786 (9th
Cir. 2011); United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 2010); United
States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 800–01 (10th Cir. 2010); United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638,
642 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Engstrum, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1231–32
(D. Utah 2009); United States v. Booker, 570 F. Supp. 2d 161, 163–64 (D. Me.
2008).
21
See sources cited supra note 20.
22
Jordan E. Pratt, A First Amendment-Inspired Approach to Heller’s
“Schools” and “Government Buildings,” 92 NEB. L. REV. 537, 558 (2014) (“The
overwhelming majority of federal courts of appeals that have entertained postHeller Second Amendment claims have adopted a two-step approach for analyzing such claims.”) (citation omitted); Daniel J. Bolin & Brent O. Denzin, When
All Heller Breaks Loose: Gun Regulation Considerations for Zoning and Planning Officials Under the New Second Amendment, 44 URB. LAW. 677, 683 (2012)
(stating that the majority of courts that have announced a standard of review for
challenged gun regulations have adopted the two-step test).
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be adopted.23 This model advocates an epicenter comprised of a core
right that has two concentric circles revolving around the epicenter.24 The farther away one moves from the core, the fewer rights
one has and the less scrutiny should be applied to any regulations
falling within those circles.25 Using this model would provide guidance to courts to better determine whether gun regulations focusing
on the “who, what, where, and how” pass constitutional muster. Specifically, this model would provide guidance on what level of scrutiny to apply to such regulations depending on where in this circle
model they fall.
This Comment will concentrate specifically on the “who” and
propose a working model using the circle diagram to determine what
standard of scrutiny to apply to regulations targeting specific individuals. Although regulations that focus on the “what, where, and
how,”––regulations focusing on what type of guns can be used,26
whether they can be used in the home versus outside of the home,27
and regulations relating to open carry versus concealed carry28––
would certainly benefit from further analysis and provide useful
guidance to the courts, they are not the focus of this Comment. The
Author will use examples of gun regulations targeting specific individuals to show how this model would work and will provide guidance on what level of scrutiny to apply to individuals falling within
certain circles around the core right of self-defense in the home.
Part I will examine the decisions of Heller and McDonald as
they relate to the evolution of the right to bear arms and the uncertainty they created among lower courts struggling to determine what
level of scrutiny to apply to gun regulations. Part II will discuss the
various levels of scrutiny lower courts have applied and commentators have advocated post-Heller. Part III will describe the circle
model of the Second Amendment by initially providing an overview
of how it has been used in relation to church autonomy and the First
23

See Bruce N. Bagni, Discrimination in the Name of the Lord: A Critical
Evaluation of Discrimination by Religious Organizations, 79 COLUM. L. REV.
1514, 1539 (1979).
24
See id.
25
See id. at 1539–40.
26
See, e.g., Fla Stat. §§ 790.16; 790.221 (2016).
27
See, e.g., Fla. Stat. §790.251 (2016).
28
See, e.g., Fla. Stat. §790.25 (2016).
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Amendment. Part III will then explain why this model, which in the
Second Amendment context builds off pre-existing models such as
Justice Breyer’s interest-balancing approach as well as the two-step
and sliding-scale models, allows for nuance and structure, making it
best-suited for examining Second Amendment regulations. This
section will then demonstrate how to apply this model to different
types of individuals to determine where in this model they fall and
thus what level of scrutiny to apply to regulations targeting them.
Therefore, even if readers do not agree with the specific application
of the model presented herein, the approach itself still works, allowing a reader to choose where in the model he believes an individual
should fall. The Comment will conclude with final thoughts.
I. HELLER AND MCDONALD—PRECEDENT-SETTING CASES WITHOUT
MUCH PRECEDENT
The Second Amendment proscribes that “[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”29 Based on
recent jurisprudence, we now know that at the very least, an individual has a fundamental right to bear arms in the home for the purpose
of self-defense.30
In District of Columbia v. Heller,31 the Supreme Court considered whether a District of Columbia prohibition on the possession
of usable handguns in the home violated the Second Amendment.32
Respondent Heller, a D.C. special police officer, applied to register
a handgun he wished to keep at home, but the District refused.33
Heller filed a lawsuit in the Federal District Court for the District of
Columbia seeking to enjoin the city from barring the registration of

29

U.S. CONST. amend. II.
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 581, 635 (2008).
31
554 U.S. 570.
32
Id. at 573–75 (The District of Columbia law banned handgun possession
by making it a crime to carry an unregistered firearm and prohibiting the registration of handguns; prohibited any person from carrying an unlicensed handgun, but
authorized the police chief to issue one-year licenses; and required residents to
keep lawfully owned firearms unloaded and dissembled or bound by a trigger lock
or similar device.).
33
Id. at 575.
30
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handguns, from enforcing the licensing requirement, and from enforcing the trigger-lock requirement because these requirements
banned the use of functional firearms in the home.34
The Supreme Court held that “the Second Amendment right is
exercised individually and belongs to all Americans,” thus establishing that there is a fundamental, individual right to bear arms in the
home for self-defense.35 The Second Amendment does not protect
the right of individuals to “carry arms for any sort of confrontation”36—“the inherent right of self-defense has been central to the
Second Amendment right,”37 and the need for self-defense is most
acute in the home.38
However, the Court made clear that the right to bear arms is not
absolute and can be regulated by stating that although the “Second
Amendment conferred an individual right to keep and bear arms . . .
the right was not unlimited, just as the First Amendment’s right of
free speech was not . . . .”39 The Court further established that limitations can be imposed on the Second Amendment by drawing attention to lawful, longstanding prohibitions on the possession of
firearms by felons and the mentally ill, laws forbidding the carrying
of firearms in sensitive places, and laws imposing conditions and
qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.40 In one of the opinion’s most important footnotes, the Court went on to explain that the
longstanding prohibitions or regulations it listed were not an exhaustive list, but were mere examples of lawful regulations.41

34

Id. at 575–76.
Id. at 581.
36
Id. at 595.
37
Id. at 628.
38
Id. (“[T]he home [is] where the need for defense of self, family, and property is most acute.”).
39
Id. at 595.
40
Id. at 626–27 (“[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally
ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places . . . or laws
imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.”).
41
Id. at 627 n.26 (“We identify these presumptively lawful regulatory
measures only as examples; our list does not purport to be exhaustive.”).
35
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Most significantly, the Supreme Court did not establish what
level of scrutiny should be applied to gun regulations in this landmark case.42 The majority merely held that the handgun ban in question was unconstitutional, regardless of the standard of scrutiny applied.43 This was because the handgun ban in Heller was a prohibition of an
entire class of “arms” that is overwhelmingly chosen
by American society for that lawful purpose. The
prohibition extends, moreover, to the home, where
the need for defense of self, family, and property is
most acute. Under any of the standards of scrutiny
that we have applied to enumerated constitutional
rights, banning from the home “the most preferred
firearm in the nation to ‘keep’ and use for protection
of one’s home and family,” would fail constitutional
muster.44
In his dissent, Justice Breyer rejected the use of strict scrutiny
because the laws the majority claimed were presumptively lawful
and constitutional would not survive strict scrutiny, so this could not
actually be the standard.45 Additionally, he noted that adoption of a
true strict scrutiny standard of review to evaluate the constitutionality of gun regulations would be “impossible” because this standard
is really a balancing test in disguise.46 Practically every gun regulation advances a “‘primary concern of every government––a concern
for the safety and indeed the lives of its citizens.’”47 Using the strict
scrutiny standard will “in practice turn into an interest-balancing inquiry,” so an interest-balancing inquiry should be explicitly
adopted.48 Thus, Justice Breyer overtly recommended an interest42

Id. at 628–29.
Id. (“Under any of the standards of scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated constitutional rights, banning from the home ‘the most preferred firearm
in the nation to ‘keep’ and use for protection of one’s home and family,’ would
fail constitutional muster.”).
44
Id. (citation omitted).
45
Id. at 688 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
46
Id. at 689.
47
Id. (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987)).
48
Id. (The interests protected by the Second Amendment will be weighed
against the governmental public-safety concerns, with the “only question being
43
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balancing inquiry that “asks whether the statute burdens a protected
interest in a way or to an extent that is out of proportion to the statute’s salutary effects upon other important governmental interests.”49 The Court rejected this approach as too free-wheeling50 because it would require the judiciary to rule on a case-by-case basis
“whether a constitutional right is actually worth insisting upon.”51
Moreover, as the Court stated, requiring firearms in the home to be
kept inoperable at all times “makes it impossible for citizens to use
them for the core lawful purpose of self-defense” and is unconstitutional.52 Thus, the Second Amendment protects an individual’s right
to self-defense in his home.53
More recently, in McDonald v. City of Chicago,54 the Supreme
Court relied on the Court’s holding in Heller55 and stated that selfdefense is a basic right and “individual self-defense is ‘the central
component’ of the Second Amendment right.”56 The Court held that
the Second Amendment right to possess a handgun in the home for
self-defense “is fully applicable to the States” under the Due Process

whether the regulation at issue impermissibly burdens the former in the course of
advancing the latter.”).
49
Id. at 689–90.
50
Id. at 634 (majority opinion) (“We know of no other enumerated constitutional right whose core protection has been subjected to a freestanding ‘interestbalancing’ approach.”).
51
Michael J. Habib, Note, The Future of Gun Control Laws Post-McDonald
and Heller and the Death of One-Gun-Per-Month Legislation, 44 CONN. L. REV.
1339, 1367 (2012).
52
Heller, 554 U.S. at 630.
53
Id. at 635.
54
The city of Chicago and the village of Oak Park had laws similar to the
District of Columbia’s, effectively banning the possession of handguns by private
citizens. Petitioners filed suit, alleging that the handgun ban and ordinances violated the Second and Fourteenth Amendments. Chicago and Oak Park argued that
their laws were constitutional because the Second Amendment was not applicable
to the States. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 750, 752 (2010).
55
Id. at 780 (“[O]ur central holding in Heller: that the Second Amendment
protects a personal right to keep and bear arms for lawful purposes, most notably
for self-defense within the home.”); see Alex Poor, Bearing the Burden of Denial:
Observations of Lower Court Decisions Misapplying Supreme Court Precedent
in Second Amendment Cases, 67 S.M.U. L. Rev. 401, 402, 411 (2014).
56
McDonald, 561 U.S. at 767 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 599).
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Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.57 Furthermore, the Supreme
Court in McDonald echoed Heller in holding that the challenged gun
regulation at issue in Heller “would fail constitutional muster” under
“any of the standards of scrutiny”58 and did not establish what level
of scrutiny to apply to gun regulations,59 leaving lower courts in a
state of confusion as to what level of review to apply.
II. AN ARRAY OF SCRUTINY
Because the Court “did not announce a standard for lower courts
to apply” in enforcing the Second Amendment right in Heller and
McDonald,60 lower courts, left to their own devices, have applied
various degrees of scrutiny.61 The most popular has been a two-step
inquiry,62 but before explaining that standard, this Comment will examine the other various levels of scrutiny courts have applied to gun
regulations.

57

Id. at 750, 759, 791. In Malloy v. Hogan, the Supreme Court, based on the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, held that “incorporated Bill
of Rights protections ‘are all to be enforced against the States under the Fourteenth
Amendment according to the same standards that protect those personal rights
against federal encroachment.’” Id. at 759, 765 (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378
U.S. 1, 10 (1964)). The Court held that “particular Bill of Rights guarantees or
remedies” applied to the states. Id. at 766. The Second Amendment right is incorporated in the concept of due process because the right to keep and bear arms, i.e.
the right to self-defense, is “fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty” and
“‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.’” Id. at 767 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)). The “Framers and ratifiers of
the Fourteenth Amendment” considered the right to keep and bear arms “necessary to our system of ordered liberty.” Id. at 778.
58
Heller, 554 U.S. at 628–29.
59
Id. at 687 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“How is a court to determine whether a
particular firearm regulation . . . is consistent with the Second Amendment? What
kind of constitutional standard should the court use? How high a protective hurdle
does the Amendment erect?”).
60
Bolin & Denzin, supra note 22, at 680.
61
Caroline L. Moran, Under the Gun: Will States’ One-Gun-Per-Month
Laws Pass Constitutional Muster After Heller and McDonald?, 38 SETON HALL
LEGIS. J. 163,174, 176 (2014).
62
See infra note 118.
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A. Competing Views Among Lower Courts
1. STRICT SCRUTINY
Few courts have adopted strict scrutiny,63 requiring that in order
for a law to be upheld, it must be necessary to achieve a compelling
state interest64 and it must be narrowly tailored to achieve this interest.65 Despite this supposedly rigorous standard, the courts that have
applied strict scrutiny have upheld challenged gun regulations as
constitutional.66
2. INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY
Few courts have applied intermediate scrutiny,67 requiring that
in order for a regulation to be upheld, it must be substantially related
to an important governmental objective.68 In United States v.
Skoien,69 defendant Steven Skoien was convicted of two misdemeanor counts of domestic violence and as a result violated 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) when he was found in possession of a shotgun.70
Skoien appealed his two-year imprisonment sentence, contending
that § 922(g)(9) violated the Second Amendment.71
In evaluating Skoien’s claim, the Seventh Circuit applied intermediate scrutiny to determine that “a law banning individuals convicted of domestic violence misdemeanors from possessing guns
bore a ‘substantial relation’ to the important government objective

63
Moran, supra note 61, at 174, 176; see, e.g., United States v. Engstrum,
609 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1231–32 (D. Utah 2009); United States v. Booker, 570 F.
Supp. 2d 161, 163–64 (D. Me. 2008).
64
Habib, supra note 51, at 1366.
65
Moran, supra note 61, at 177.
66
Booker, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 164–65; Engstrum, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 1235.
67
United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 642 (7th Cir. 2010).
68
Habib, supra note 51, at 1366.
69
614 F.3d 638.
70
Id. at 639.
71
Id.

2017]

FITTING A GUN IN A CIRCLE

907

of ‘preventing armed mayhem.’”72 Although the court did not explicitly explain why it adopted an intermediate level of scrutiny,73 it
compared Second Amendment regulations to First Amendment regulations that were examined under an intermediate scrutiny framework.74 The Seventh Circuit merely noted that applying intermediate scrutiny is “prudent,” that § 922(g)(9) is valid because it is substantially related to an important governmental objective––preventing armed mayhem—and that “we need not get more deeply into the
‘levels of scrutiny’ quagmire.”75
In determining that § 922(g)(9) is constitutional, the court stated
that because the recidivism rate is high among domestic violence
offenders, “there are substantial benefits in keeping the most deadly
weapons out of the hands of domestic abusers.”76 The court also
noted that domestic abusers often commit acts that if committed
against strangers would be felonies, as well as the fact that firearms
are deadly in domestic abuse.77
3. THE UNDUE BURDEN STANDARD
Some courts78 have suggested the use of the undue burden standard used in abortion jurisprudence79 as the standard of scrutiny that
should be used to assess whether a challenged gun regulation is constitutional. In the abortion context, an undue burden is a regulation
that places a “substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an

72

Stephen Kiehl, Comment, In Search of A Standard: Gun Regulations After
Heller and McDonald, 70 MD. L. REV. 1131, 1161 (2011) (footnote omitted); see
Skoien, 614 F.3d at 642 (“[T]he goal of § 922(g)(9), preventing armed mayhem,
is an important governmental objective. Both logic and data establish a substantial
relation between § 922(g)(9) and this objective.”).
73
Although the court did explain that a rational basis standard would be inappropriate because under this standard any law is valid if a justification for it can
be imagined. Skoien, 614 F.3d at 641.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 641–42.
76
Id. at 644; see Kiehl, supra note 72, at 1161.
77
Skoien, 614 F.3d at 643–44.
78
See, e.g., Nordyke v. King, 644 F.3d 776, 782–84, 786 (9th Cir. 2011).
79
Bolin & Denzin, supra note 22, at 683 n.41 (“pre-viability abortion regulations are unconstitutional if they impose an ‘undue burden’ on a woman’s right
to terminate her pregnancy”).
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abortion of a nonviable fetus.”80 The Supreme Court stated that “an
undue burden is an unconstitutional burden.”81 According to the undue burden standard, regulations that substantially burden, or place
a substantial obstacle in the way of a core right, should receive
heightened scrutiny.82
The Ninth Circuit, in Nordyke v. King, addressed “whether the
Second Amendment prohibits a local government from banning gun
shows on its property.”83 Originally, the Ninth Circuit adopted an
undue burden standard when it held that “only regulations that substantially burden the right to keep and to bear arms should receive
heightened scrutiny.”84 In explaining its application of an undue burden standard, the court reasoned that Heller and McDonald “urged
a ‘substantial burden’ approach based on the Supreme Court’s evaluation of a regulation’s relationship to the ‘core right’ protected by
the Second Amendment.”85 The court held that the undue burden
test would avoid “many of the difficult empirical questions as to the
effectiveness of gun regulations that would arise under a strict scrutiny test.”86
While applying the undue burden standard, the Ninth Circuit
found that the county ordinance did not substantially burden the Second Amendment as the “ordinance did not make it materially more
difficult to obtain firearms or create a shortage of places to purchase
guns in and around the county, because it merely eliminates gun
shows on government property.”87
80

Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992) (“[A]
statute which, while furthering the interest in potential life or some other valid
state interest, has the effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a
woman’s choice cannot be considered a permissible means of serving its legitimate ends.”).
81
Id.
82
Bolin & Denzin, supra note 22, at 682–83; see Nordyke, 644 F.3d at 782–
84, 786.
83
Nordyke, 644 F.3d at 780.
84
Bolin & Denzin, supra note 22, at 682 (footnote omitted); see Nordyke,
644 F.3d at 782–84, 786.
85
Bolin & Denzin, supra note 22, at 682–83 (footnote omitted); see Nordyke,
644 F.3d at 783.
86
Bolin & Denzin, supra note 22, at 683 (footnote omitted); see Nordyke,
644 F.3d at 785.
87
Bolin & Denzin, supra note 22, at 683 (footnote omitted); see Nordyke,
644 F.3d at 787–88.
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Some courts and commentators have criticized the undue burden
test “based on its similarity to Justice Breyer’s ‘interest-balancing’
approach that was rejected by the Heller and McDonald Courts.”88
In particular, the undue burden’s substantial obstacle inquiry in relation to a specific regulation is closely related to Justice Breyer’s
interest-balancing approach, which “asks whether the statute burdens a protected interest in a way or to an extent that is out of proportion to the statute’s salutary effects upon other important governmental interests.”89 As one federal judge remarked on the similarity,
“this court strongly doubts that the Heller majority envisioned the
undue burden standard when it left for another day a determination
of the level of scrutiny to be applied to firearms laws.”90
Nordyke v. King has had a long and complicated procedural history since first reaching the Ninth Circuit twelve years before that
court’s most recent opinion in 2012.91 In its most recent ruling, the
court failed to adopt any standard of scrutiny.92 The Ninth Circuit
left the undue burden test “in further limbo by declining to apply
any test in affirming the dismissal of the Second Amendment challenge after the county reinterpreted its ordinance . . . .”93 The Ninth

88

Bolin & Denzin, supra note 22, at 683 (footnote omitted); see Kiehl, supra
note 72, at 1156; Lawrence Rosenthal & Joyce Lee Malcolm, McDonald v. Chicago: Which Standard of Scrutiny Should Apply to Gun Control Laws?, 105 NW.
U. L. REV. 437, 446–47 (2011) (Despite Heller’s rejection of the interest-balancing test, this approach may be inescapable in Second Amendment jurisprudence
as evidenced by the “historical acceptance of concealed-carry prohibitions [that]
cannot be explained by anything other than this very type of interest-balancing
. . . .” To avoid contradicting Heller’s rejection of interest-balancing, “the Court
may utilize a different form of words, such as an undue burden test, but in practical
operation, its approach is likely to be little different” than the interest-balancing
approach.).
89
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 689–90 (2008) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
90
Kiehl, supra note 72, at 1156 (quoting Heller II, 698 F. Supp. 2d 179, 187
(D.D.C. 2010)).
91
681 F.3d 1041, 1043 (9th Cir. 2012).
92
Id. at 1045 (O’Scannlain, J., concurring) (“But I cannot agree with the majority’s approach, which fails to explain the standard of scrutiny under which it
evaluates the ordinance.”) (footnote omitted).
93
Bolin & Denzin, supra note 22, at 683 (footnote omitted); see Nordyke,
681 F.3d at 1044 (majority opinion) (“No matter how broad the scope of the Sec-
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Circuit adopted a similar approach to gun regulations as the Court
in Heller94 when it stated that the plaintiffs “in the present case . . .
cannot succeed, no matter what form of scrutiny applies to Second
Amendment claims.”95 Thus, it is unclear whether courts will continue applying the undue burden test.96
4. THE TWO-STEP TEST—A HYBRID OF STRICT AND INTERMEDIATE
Another test adopted by lower courts to evaluate the constitutionality of gun regulations is the two-step test97 first adopted by the
Third Circuit in United States v. Marzzarella.98 Under this approach,
“modeled after the approach in First Amendment cases,”99 courts
first ask whether the challenged regulation imposes a burden on conduct that falls within the scope of the Second Amendment’s protection.100 This means courts must determine whether a gun regulation
has a historical basis, indicating it was within the scope of the Second Amendment at the time of ratification.101 If it does not fall

ond Amendment—an issue that we leave for another day—it is clear that, as applied to Plaintiffs’ gun shows and as interpreted by the County, this regulation is
permissible.”).
94
Heller, 554 U.S. at 628–29 (stating that the ban of handguns in the home
would fail to pass constitutional muster under any standard of scrutiny).
95
Nordyke, 681 F.3d at 1045.
96
Id. at 1045 n.2 (O’Scannlain, J., concurring) (“All that is clear from the
majority’s approach is that the majority cannot be evaluating the ordinance under
strict scrutiny.”); see also Bolin & Denzin, supra note 22, at 683 (explaining that
the Ninth Circuit left the substantial burden test in limbo).
97
See Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 194 (5th Cir. 2012); GeorgiaCarry.Org., Inc.
v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1260 n.34 (11th Cir. 2012); United States v. Greeno,
679 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2012); Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1252 (D.C. Cir.
2011); Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 701–04 (7th Cir. 2011); United
States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. Reese, 627
F.3d 792, 800–01 (10th Cir. 2010); United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89
(3d Cir. 2010).
98
614 F.3d at 89.
99
Bolin & Denzin, supra note 22, at 681; see Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 89 n.4
(explaining that the Court will look to First Amendment doctrine to inform its
analysis of the Second Amendment).
100
Pratt, supra note 22, at 558.
101
Ezell, 651 F.3d at 702–03; Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 89; Chester, 628 F.3d
at 680; Reese, 627 F.3d at 800–01.
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within the historical scope of the Second Amendment, then the regulation is constitutional.102 If the “historical evidence is inconclusive”103 or suggests that the regulation does “burden conduct that the
Second Amendment protects . . . courts will ask whether it passes
muster under the appropriate level of heightened review”—either
strict or intermediate scrutiny. 104
During this second step, courts will choose a level of scrutiny
“based on how close the burdened right comes to the core of the
Second Amendment’s guarantee and how severely the challenged
[regulation] burdens that right.”105 Regulations that burden the core
Second Amendment right of armed self-defense in the home should
be evaluated using strict scrutiny.106 Laws that do not burden the
core right should be evaluated using intermediate scrutiny.107 This
two-step test “combines both a historical and an interest-balancing
inquiry.”108 This two-step hybrid approach was first adopted by the
Third Circuit, and was later adopted by the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits.109
Closely related to the two-step model, the application of a sliding-scale model to Second Amendment regulations has been suggested by commentators to determine what level of scrutiny to apply.110 This model has proven useful in other contexts such as evaluating regulations restricting freedom of speech and the right to
vote.111 Under the sliding-scale model, “the level of scrutiny utilized
102
103
104
105
106

Pratt, supra note 22, at 558.
Ezell, 651 F.3d at 703.
Pratt, supra note 22, at 558.
Id. at 558–59.
Moran, supra note 61, at 177; see, e.g., Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 89, 96–

97.
107

Moran, supra note 61, at 177; see, e.g., Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 89, 97.
Lindsay Colvin, History, Heller, and High-Capacity Magazines: What is
the Proper Standard of Review for Second Amendment Challenges?, 41 FORDHAM
URB. L. J. 1041, 1058 (2014).
109
See sources cited supra note 97.
110
Michael J. Habib, The Second Amendment Standard of Review: The Quintessential Clean-Slate for Sliding-Scale Scrutiny, 37 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 13,
13 (2012) (“[T]he Second Amendment provides the quintessential ‘clean slate’ to
apply a rarely utilized level of judicial review that can be called ‘sliding scale
scrutiny.’”); Habib, supra note 51, at 1369–70, 1373.
111
Habib, supra note 110, at 14 (In explaining the sliding-scale model’s application in other contexts: “[w]hile strict scrutiny is generally applied to laws that
108
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by a court in assessing the constitutionality of a restrictive regulation
will vary between strict and intermediate scrutiny, based on the impact the regulation has on the core of the right.”112 The sliding-scale
model is a “hybrid level of scrutiny.”113 This model is essentially the
same as the two-step model114 adopted by the Third, Fourth, Fifth,
Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits.115 Under the
sliding-scale model, any law that restricts the core right to bear arms
is subject to strict scrutiny, and any law that does not restrict the
primary purpose or core of the right to bear arms, “but rather regulates how one may exercise that right,” is subject to intermediate
scrutiny.116 Thus, since Heller and McDonald, lower courts have applied various standards of scrutiny to gun regulations.
B. The Verdict is In—Two-Step Wins
Despite a lack of clear precedent of what level of scrutiny to apply to Second Amendment challenges,117 the majority of lower
courts have applied the two-step test as the prevailing standard of
restrict the right to free speech and the right to vote, intermediate scrutiny is used
in First Amendment regulations that target the time, manner, and place, but not
content, of speech, and in ballot access cases when the issue is the right to appear
on a ballot. This means that, for purpose of the First Amendment and the right to
vote, undoubtedly fundamental rights, there are multiple levels of scrutiny that
may apply.”).
112
Id. at 13.
113
Habib, supra note 51, at 1370.
114
See Bolin & Denzin, supra note 22, at 680, 683 (To apply the two-part test,
courts must first decide whether a challenged law restricts conduct falling within
the scope of the Second Amendment, and if it does not, the inquiry is complete.
If the law restricts the core right to bear arms, it is subject to strict scrutiny. Regulations that do not restrict the core right but are lawful under Heller are subject
to an intermediate level of scrutiny that depends on the type of conduct being
regulated and the degree to which the law burdens the right.).
115
See sources cited supra note 97.
116
Habib, supra note 110, at 14–15. According to proponents of the slidingscale model, it “would balance the burden of government regulation in the interest
of public safety with the fundamental right to bear arms and be a more fitting level
of scrutiny for this unique right.” Id. at 14. This model “will weigh the means by
which one seeks to exercise the right to bear arms with the end result that the
regulation will have on the interests protected by the right.” Id. at 14-15.
117
Poor, supra note 55, at 402, 417 (the Supreme Court did specify that rational basis scrutiny and Justice Breyer’s interest-balancing approach are inappropriate standards of review).
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review for gun regulations.118 As will be discussed below, the proposed use of the circle model in the Second Amendment context will
build upon the two-step hybrid test of strict and intermediate scrutiny to provide courts with a more workable method of establishing
what level of scrutiny to apply to specific gun regulations.119
III. THE CIRCLE MODEL AND THE SECOND AMENDMENT—AN
OBVIOUS COLLABORATION
A. The Circle Model and the First Amendment—A Genesis Story
The circle model was first proposed in the context of church autonomy and freedom of religion protected by the First Amendment
to explain to what extent religious organizations should be allowed
to discriminate based on the First Amendment’s free exercise of religion and when the government should be allowed to regulate such
discriminatory practices.120 Bruce Bagni suggests that the traditional
balancing approach for “resolving religious organizations’ claims of
exemption from antidiscrimination laws” based on free exercise of
religion and church autonomy “has led to unsatisfactory and conflicting results”121 to the “detriment of both first amendment values
and the national commitment to eradicate discrimination.”122
118
Pratt, supra note 22, at 558 (“The overwhelming majority of federal courts
of appeals that have entertained post-Heller Second Amendment claims have
adopted a two-step approach for analyzing such claims.”) (citation omitted). It
should be noted that a number of commentators incorrectly refer to the two-step
test as intermediate scrutiny, but in actuality, they are referring to the hybrid twostep test. See, e.g., Bolin & Denzin, supra note 22, at 683 (stating that the majority
of courts that have announced a standard of review for challenged gun regulations
have adopted the “kind of intermediate scrutiny described in Section II.A.” However, the type of scrutiny discussed in that section of the article was the two-step
test); Rosenthal & Malcolm, supra note 88, at 440 n.13 (“At the appellate level,
there has been something of a trend toward a form of intermediate scrutiny requiring that the challenged regulation be substantially related to an important governmental objective.” These authors then list a string of cases that all employed the
two-step test.).
119
See infra Section III.B.
120
Bagni, supra note 23, at 1514, 1539; Douglas Laycock, Towards a General
Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the
Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1402 (1981).
121
Bagni, supra note 23, at 1549.
122
Id. at 1538–39.
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The circle model was offered as a “more satisfactory approach . . . for resolving the conflict between religious liberty and
the quest for human equality” by providing a more workable method
for resolving this conflict.123 Bagni starts with the premise that the
government generally cannot regulate core activities and relationships in a church—those that are “purely spiritual or integral facets
of the actual practice of the religion.”124 “Emanating from this core
are a series of activities and relationships with increasing indicia of
secularity”125 to which decreasing levels of scrutiny apply. This concept is best illustrated by a circle model, with an epicenter consisting
of the purely spiritual aspects of a church, and three concentric circles revolving around the epicenter.126
The epicenter is comprised of the “relationship between a church
and its clergy and modes of worship and ritual,” as well as membership policies of a church, religious education programs, and churchoperated schools that “teach secular subjects with a decidedly religious orientation.”127 The first concentric circle emanating from the
epicenter includes church-sponsored community activities, such as
adoption agencies, homes for the elderly, hospitals, and schools
dominated by secular courses in which religiosity is “present but not
pervasive.”128 This circle also includes relationships between the
church and “support employees with some religious or quasi-religious functions.”129 The second circle contains a church’s secular
business activities and relationships between secular employees,
such as clerks or janitors, who perform purely nonspiritual functions.130 The third, and outermost, circle is comprised of the “totally
secular world.”131
The spiritual epicenter of a church, or the core, can rarely be
regulated by the government because this would infringe on the
church’s autonomy and thus would be subject to the highest form of
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131

Id. at 1539.
Id.
Id.; Laycock, supra note 120, at 1409.
Bagni, supra note 23, at 1539; Laycock, supra note 120, at 1402–03.
Bagni, supra note 23, at 1539.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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scrutiny—strict scrutiny.132 The only type of regulation that might
be justified in the epicenter is the need to assure the physical safety
of church members, nonmembers, or of the community.133 A church
must be afforded the right to discriminate in relation to activities
falling within its spiritual epicenter, such as selecting its congregants, because the free exercise of religion guarantees this right.134
Moreover, the members of any specific religious sect must be allowed to freely model their internal structure because the existence
of their religion depends on this.135
As one moves further away from the core, the fewer religious
rights the church has and the less scrutiny should be applied.136
When a church’s activities fall outside the epicenter, the church is
subject to regulation proportionate to the circle within which that
activity falls––it may still be afforded some First Amendment protection, but these claims must be examined while simultaneously
considering general societal interests against discrimination.137
Thus, activities and relationships falling outside the epicenter may
be regulated “to differing degrees by the state.”138
The application of the epicenter analysis in evaluating activities
that do not fall within the spiritual epicenter can be illustrated by
examining church-related schools that engage in discriminatory
practices.139 Under this analysis, the “best way to evaluate a religious school’s discriminatory admissions policy is to ask to what
extent enrollment in the school is distinguishable from membership

132

Id.
Id.
134
Id. at 1540–41 (“A church may choose to exclude persons for purely secular reasons; such a decision is simply outside the purview of civil government. In
this sense, the right to control membership is absolute.”).
135
Id. at 1540.
136
Id. at 1539–40 (“Once, however, the church acts outside this epicenter and
moves closer to the purely secular world, it subjects itself to secular regulation
proportionate to the degree of secularity of its activities and relationships.”); Laycock, supra note 120, at 1409.
137
Bagni, supra note 23, at 1540.
138
Id. at 1549.
139
Id. at 1541. As previously explained, schools fall in the epicenter if they
“teach secular subjects with a decidedly religious orientation” or in the first circle
if they are “dominated by secular courses” and “religious orientation is present
but not pervasive.” Id. at 1539.
133
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in a church,” and thus not a purely spiritual activity.140 In examining
this issue, a court must first inquire whether the organization—here,
the school— is, in fact, religious, and then ask “whether the religious
mission permeates the educational process.”141 If the court decides
that the school is a religious school whose main purpose is to teach
classes in a religious context, then the school’s admissions policy
cannot be regulated in accordance with the free exercise of religion.142 However, if the school is found to not be predominantly religious and discriminates in accepting students, the school’s claim
of exemption from regulation cannot be honored because this falls
in the quasi-secular circle.143 The practice must be weighed against
the governmental interest in equality,144 thus subjecting it to intermediate scrutiny.
The benefit of the circle model is that case-by-case balancing is
not required, “for implicit in [the epicenter] approach is that the facts
and circumstances of each case dictate a result for that case.”145 This
is because there are certain rules and guidelines about what each
circle includes, so this model clearly lays out where a specific activity falls, without needing to painstakingly figure out what type of
scrutiny to apply to any given activity.146 As a result, this model
provides an excellent basis for evaluating Second Amendment regulations because the circle model by its very nature provides comprehensive guidance and a much more workable method of analysis
than models currently used.147
B. The Circle Model and the Second Amendment—Why It Works
The circle model would be the best model to use to evaluate gun
regulations because it provides flexibility and ease of use, while at
the same time providing structure and guidance for a predictable re-

140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147

Id.
Id. at 1542–43.
Id. at 1543.
Id. at 1543–44.
Id. at 1544.
Id.
Id.
See id.
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sult. It is logical to apply the circle model because this model provides the nuance of Justice Breyer’s interest-balancing approach,148
but addresses the weakness of his approach, i.e. that it is vague and
free-wheeling,149 by providing clearer guidance. Justice Breyer’s interest-balancing approach “asks whether the statute burdens a protected interest in a way or to an extent that is out of proportion to the
statute’s salutary effects upon other important governmental interests.”150 This inquiry is similar to the circle model, which requires a
comparable balancing approach, but is framed differently because it
does not provide any real guidance to the judiciary in making such
decisions.151 The Supreme Court rejected the interest-balancing approach because it was too free-wheeling152 due to the fact that it
would have required the judiciary to rule on a case-by-case basis
“whether a constitutional right is actually worth insisting upon.”153
The circle model corrects this problem because this model does not
require case-by-case balancing.154 Justice Breyer had the right idea,
but it simply needed more structure, and the circle model assuages
the Supreme Court’s concerns155 by providing much more guidance,
structure, and predictability, while at the same time allowing for
flexibility and nuance.156
The circle model also builds on the idea behind the lower courts’
use of the two-part test, and commentators’ sliding-scale model,
which require courts to choose a level of scrutiny “based on how
close the burdened right comes to the core of the Second Amendment’s guarantee and how severely the challenged [regulation] burdens that right.”157 According to the two-part test, regulations affecting the core Second Amendment right of armed self-defense in the

148
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 689–90 (2008) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
149
Id. at 634 (majority opinion).
150
Id. at 689–90 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
151
See id.
152
Id. at 634 (majority opinion).
153
Habib, supra note 51, at 1367.
154
Bagni, supra note 23, at 1544 (“[F]or implicit in [the epicenter] approach
is that the facts and circumstances of each case dictate a result for that case.”).
155
Heller, 554 U.S. at 634.
156
Bagni, supra note 23, at 1544.
157
Pratt, supra note 22, at 558–59.
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home should be evaluated using strict scrutiny.158 But laws that do
not affect the core right should be evaluated using intermediate scrutiny.159
The circle model builds on these models as it, too, is comprised
of the belief that the core right requires strict scrutiny and falls at the
epicenter of the model.160 As one moves further away from the epicenter, regulations are easier to justify.161 They require less scrutiny
the further away from the core they fall on the model.162
However, unlike the two-part test and the sliding-scale model,
the circle model provides a more comprehensive guide. The twopart test and the sliding-scale model, which for all intents and purposes are the same thing,163 are incomplete because under these
models “a restrictive regulation will vary between strict and intermediate scrutiny, based on the impact the regulation has on the core
of the right.”164 These models fail to include rational basis to evaluate any challenged regulations.165 Rational basis should be applied
to certain regulations,166 and thus the two-part test and sliding-scale
model completely disregard this level of scrutiny.167 The proposed
circle model builds on the two-part test and sliding-scale model and
brings these models to their logical end, thus providing much more
guidance in determining whether a specific Second Amendment
challenge is constitutional.
It should be noted that First Amendment jurisprudence has previously been used to elaborate upon and make sense of Second
Amendment jurisprudence.168 The two-step test first adopted by the
158

Moran, supra note 61, at 177; Habib, supra note 110, at 13.
Habib, supra note 110, at 13.
160
Bagni, supra note 23, at 1539.
161
Id. at 1539–40.
162
Id.
163
See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
164
Habib, supra note 110, at 13; Moran, supra note 61, at 177.
165
Id.
166
See infra Section III.C.2.
167
Habib, supra note 110, at 13.
168
See Bolin & Denzin, supra note 22, at 681; see also United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 96–97 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[T]he right to free speech, an undeniably enumerated fundamental right, is susceptible to several standards of scrutiny, depending upon the type of law challenged and the type of speech at issue.
We see no reason why the Second Amendment would be any different.”) (citation
omitted); United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 682 (4th Cir. 2010) (“[W]e agree
159
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Third Circuit in United States v. Marzzarella169 was “modeled after
the approach in First Amendment cases.”170 The court in Marzzarella stated that it would look to First Amendment doctrine to inform its analysis of the Second Amendment.171 Additionally, many
commentators have drawn comparisons between First Amendment
and Second Amendment jurisprudence.172 Thus, because First
Amendment law has a history of guiding Second Amendment
law,173 it makes sense to use another First Amendment model, the
circle model used in the context of church autonomy and freedom
of religion, to evaluate Second Amendment regulations.
C. Applying the Circle Model—Determining What Level of
Scrutiny to Apply
The application of the circle model is fairly straightforward. The
circle model in the Second Amendment context is comprised of an
epicenter with two concentric circles revolving around it.174 The
core right of bearing arms in the home for self-defense is at the epicenter of this model and regulations that affect this core right trigger
the highest level of scrutiny—strict scrutiny.175 As one moves further away from the center, the less scrutiny need be applied.176 Any
with those who advocate looking to the First Amendment as a guide in developing
a standard of review for the Second Amendment.”).
169
614 F.3d at 89.
170
Bolin & Denzin, supra note 22, at 681.
171
614 F.3d at 89 n.4.
172
In explaining why certain gun regulations trigger strict scrutiny and others
trigger intermediate scrutiny, commentators have drawn comparisons between the
Second Amendment and First Amendment. Certain types of speech regulations,
such as content-based restrictions, are presumptively invalid and require strict
scrutiny, and other types of speech, such as content-neutral speech, can be regulated and are subject to intermediate scrutiny. There is still other speech that is not
protected by the First Amendment. This is a useful analogy for determining what
level of scrutiny to apply to gun restrictions. Kiehl, supra note 72, at 1165; James
E. Fleming & Linda C. McClain, Ordered Gun Liberty: Rights with Responsibilities and Regulation, 94 B.U. L. REV. 849, 864 (2014); Brian C. Whitman, Comment, In Defense of Self-Defense: Heller’s Second Amendment in Sensitive
Places, 81 MISS. L.J. 1987, 2016 (2012).
173
See sources cited supra note 168.
174
See Bagni, supra note 23, at 1539; Laycock, supra note 120, at 1402.
175
See Bagni, supra note 23, at 1539.
176
See id. at 1539–40.

920

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:895

regulations falling in the first circle emanating from the epicenter
trigger intermediate scrutiny and any regulations falling in the second circle trigger rational basis.177 This model provides a much
more workable method for determining what level of scrutiny to apply to a specific regulation.178 The circle model provides nuance and
structure, with fairly predictable results, while still allowing for flexibility.179 Here is a diagram of the circle model and the appropriate
level of scrutiny that would be applied in each circle:

Rational Basis

Intermediate
Scrutiny

Core Right
Strict
Scrutiny

Below, the Author will explain how she foresees the circle
model being applied to challenged gun regulations affecting specific

177
178
179

See id.
See id. at 1544.
See supra Section III.B.
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individuals: law-abiding citizens, both with and without mental illness, and felons. However, even if readers do not necessarily agree
with the application of the model, namely the following breakdown
of where these specific individuals fall within the circle model, the
Author believes readers can agree that the circle model approach is
still applicable.180
Individuals without mental illness fall in the core of the model,
requiring regulations affecting these individuals to be analyzed using strict scrutiny. One circle removed from the core, requiring intermediate scrutiny, is where individuals with mental illnesses fall.
And two circles removed from the core, triggering a mere rational
basis review, is where felons fall.
1. LAW-ABIDING CITIZENS
For purposes of understanding gun regulations, law-abiding citizens should be broken down into both those with and without mental illness. Below, following the discussion of why law-abiding citizens without mental illness fall in the core of the model, the Author
will explain why regulations targeting the mentally ill fall in the first
circle removed from the core, triggering a different level of scrutiny.

180

The circle model is still open to interpretation and this Comment by no
means intends to limit how it can specifically be applied to various gun regulations
affecting specific individuals. Readers can choose where in the circle model they
believe these individuals fall, and this may not necessarily align with where I have
placed these individuals. However, I believe that the reasoning behind using the
circle model, i.e. the approach itself, still holds true and makes this the most sound
model to evaluate challenged gun regulations.
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i. Individuals without Mental Illness
The Heller Court emphasized that the Second Amendment only
applies to law-abiding citizens,181 so individuals without mental illness certainly fall in the core of the protection.182 Perhaps the hardest
line to draw in the application of this model is how to differentiate
when regulations targeting individuals without mental illness fall in
the epicenter or the first circle emanating from the center. Generally,
individuals without mental illness will fall in the core of the circle
and regulations that restrict such an individual’s right to bear arms
in the home will be examined using strict scrutiny.183
However, not all regulations that are aimed at individuals without mental illness will restrict the fundamental right to bear arms in
the home for self-defense.184 Such regulations should instead trigger
intermediate scrutiny. Although this Comment focuses on the “who”
factor, a more comprehensive understanding of this idea can only be
attained if the “who” factor is looked at in combination with the
“what, where, and how” factors, i.e. what kind of weapon, where the
weapon is used, and how it is used. The circle model dictates that it
is only if all factors—“who, what, where, and how”—fall in the core
that strict scrutiny applies. For example, if a gun regulation targets
an individual without mental illness’s ability to use a handgun in his
home, this certainly triggers strict scrutiny. But if one of those factors is changed, i.e. the regulation targets the use of guns outside of
the home, or the use of a semi-automatic gun or a rifle, then intermediate scrutiny applies. A law restricting an individual without
mental illness’s ability to bear arms in specific places outside of the

181
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008) (The Second
Amendment “surely elevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding,
responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.”); see Patrick J.
Charles, The Second Amendment Standard of Review After McDonald: “Historical Guideposts” and the Missing Arguments in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 2
AKRON J. CONST. L & POL’Y 7, 27 (2010); Habib, supra note 51, at 1369–70,
1373.
182
See infra Section III.C.1.ii for a discussion of why those with mental illness
do not fall in the core of the circle model despite being law-abiding citizens.
183
See Bagni, supra note 23, at 1539.
184
Heller, 554 U.S. at 581.
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home should not be looked at using strict scrutiny, but rather intermediate scrutiny.185
Thus, as far as the “who” is concerned, for general ease of use,
individuals without mental illness should fall in the core of the circle
model, and trigger strict scrutiny. But one must be aware that if other
factors do not also fall in the core, then regulations affecting such
individuals might not require strict scrutiny. Thus, in certain circumstances, laws that regulate these individuals may fall in the first circle—triggering intermediate scrutiny. This placement, however, is
based on many other things, such as the “what, where, and how”
factors.186
ii. Individuals with Mental Illness
The mentally ill187 fall in the first circle emanating from the epicenter of the circle model. To comprehend this breakdown, one
must understand why some mentally ill individuals are different
than those who are not mentally ill, why felons are different than
individuals with mental illness, and thus why regulations targeting
the mentally ill trigger a higher standard of review than those targeting felons.
Individuals with mental illness are generally not any more dangerous than law-abiding citizens in the general public, but there are
some mentally ill individuals who may be more likely to commit
185

It should be noted that in certain situations it is difficult to determine in
which circle to place individuals without mental illness. This is because these scenarios usually involve not only the “who” aspect, but require one to consider the
“what, where, and how” aspects simultaneously.
186
These factors, however, are not the focus of this Comment, so for general
application, individuals without mental illness should fall in the core.
187
It is extremely difficult to define who is mentally ill because most of the
country could fall into this category. Perhaps the easiest way to determine if someone is mentally ill for the purpose of evaluating gun regulations is according to
the federal standard “banning gun possession only after someone is involuntarily
committed to a psychiatric facility or designated as mentally ill or incompetent
after a court proceeding or other formal legal process.” Michael Luo & Mike
McIntire, When the Right to Bear Arms Includes the Mentally Ill, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 21, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/22/us/when-the-right-to-beararms-includes-the-mentally-ill.html?_r=0. However, few individuals with mental
health issues reach this point. Id. Some classic examples of afflictions of those
who are considered mentally ill are schizophrenia, depression, paranoia, and bipolar disorder. Id.
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violence.188 “Past violent tendencies, noncompliance with medication, and substance abuse are factors” indicating that a mentally ill
person is more prone to violence.189 “The correlation between sociopathic behavior”—a pattern of manipulating, exploiting, or violating the rights of others—“and criminal behavior is strong.”190 For
general ease of use of this model, all individuals with mental illness
fall in the first circle emanating from the core, and challenged regulations that target these individuals should be examined using intermediate scrutiny191 because the government has an important interest in regulating gun ownership among these types of individuals.192
Additionally, the mentally ill are different than felons because
despite the fact that some mentally ill individuals are more likely to
commit violence,193 “there is a clear distinction between those who
are ‘mentally ill’ and those who are dangerous.”194 Unlike felons,
just because someone is classified as mentally ill does not mean he
is no longer a law-abiding citizen.195 And “only about 3–5% of all
violent acts are attributable to people with a serious mental illness.”196 Thus, the mentally ill are still afforded some of the protections of the Second Amendment.197
By placing the mentally ill in the first circle emanating from the
core and applying intermediate scrutiny to gun regulations affecting
these individuals, courts will be able to reconcile198 the Second
188
Steven W. Dulan, State of Madness: Mental Health and Gun Regulations,
31 T. M. COOLEY L. REV. 1, 9 (2014).
189
Id. at 9–10.
190
Id. at 10.
191
One commentator suggests applying intermediate scrutiny to regulations
targeting the mentally ill. Id. at 13–14 (The author explains that courts should look
to First Amendment jurisprudence and the articulation and application of intermediate scrutiny in order to examine regulations targeting the mentally ill. “While
simply grouping all people with mental illness together and denying Second
Amendment rights arguably should not pass even rational-basis review, more narrowly tailored and clearly articulated standards could possibly balance the respective interests at play.”).
192
Habib, supra note 51, at 1366.
193
See supra notes 188–89 and accompanying text.
194
Dulan, supra note 188, at 2.
195
Id. at 9.
196
Id.
197
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 (2008).
198
Dulan, supra note 188, at 10–11.
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Amendment’s protection afforded to law-abiding citizens,199 such as
the mentally ill, while simultaneously acknowledging that regulations targeting the mentally ill are presumptively lawful.200 Thus, the
mentally ill have a right to bear arms; however, it is not an absolute
right because there is an important governmental interest in public
safety that is also considered.201
2. FELONS
As the Supreme Court explained, only law-abiding citizens are
protected by the Second Amendment right to bear arms.202 And
“[o]nly law-abiding individuals obey firearm bans and disarm themselves in fear of criminal sanctions.”203 The ban on possession of
firearms by all felons was enacted in 1961.204 Regulations that affect
felons are presumptively lawful as the Court explained in Heller.205
But rather than applying a heightened level of scrutiny (i.e. intermediate scrutiny) to regulations affecting such individuals as most
lower courts and commentators would advocate,206 a rational basis
standard of review is more fitting.

199

Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.
Id. at 626–27.
201
Id.; see Dulan, supra note 188, at 13.
202
Heller, 554 U.S. at 635 (The Second Amendment “surely elevates above
all other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.”); Charles, supra note 181, at 27 (“[T]he Heller majority made it clear that the right only extends to ‘law-abiding, responsible citizens
to use arms in defense of hearth and home.’”) (citation omitted); Habib, supra
note 51, at 1369–70, 1373 (“Likewise, it seems that the central privileges of the
right to bear arms are available most acutely to ‘law-abiding, responsible citizens.’”) (citation omitted).
203
Whitman, supra note 172, at 1988.
204
United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting that Pub.
L. No. 87–342, 75 Stat. 757 (1961) extended “the disqualification [of arms ownership] to all persons convicted of any ‘crime punishable by imprisonment for a
term exceeding one year’, the current federal definition of a ‘felony’”).
205
554 U.S. at 626–27.
206
Moran, supra note 61, at 174 (stating that most lower courts have applied
intermediate scrutiny when reviewing Second Amendment challenges); Rosenthal & Malcolm, supra note 88, at 440 n.13 (explaining that at the appellate level,
most courts have settled on intermediate scrutiny as the proper standard of review
for challenged gun regulations); Habib, supra note 51, at 1374 (“[W]hen regulatory schemes seek to regulate or restrict the exercise of the right to bear arms by
200
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In light of the fact that the Second Amendment protection only
applies to law-abiding citizens,207 regulations that affect felons
should be reviewed under the least restrictive form of scrutiny—rational basis—despite the fact that the Court in Heller rejected the
use of this standard of review.208 The Court in Heller rejected this
level of scrutiny because it would make all regulations constitutional.209 However, the Court only rejected rational basis review in
relation to law-abiding citizens, because the Second Amendment
only protects the rights of law-abiding citizens.210
It is not unheard of for felons to have limited rights—it has long
been accepted that those who have a criminal capacity and willingness to harm others should forfeit their fundamental right to vote.211
As a result, it would not be unprecedented for felons to also forfeit
their right to bear arms.
Thus, felons fall completely outside the protection of the Second
Amendment,212 and as per the circle model,213 felons fall in the
outermost sphere, so regulations affecting them are the farthest removed from the core right of the Second Amendment. These types
of regulations have the least effect on the core right to bear arms and
should be reviewed under the least restrictive rational basis standard
of review.214
Regulations that affect different types of felons should all be
viewed under a rational basis review because all of these individuals
fall outside of the Second Amendment’s protections as they are not
law-abiding.215 The Author will delve more deeply into regulations
citizens who are not law-abiding and responsible, such regulations will be reviewed with a level of scrutiny below strict scrutiny, but above rational-basis.”).
207
Charles, supra note 181, at 27.
208
Whitman, supra note 172, at 2015 (Heller “declare[d] that rational basis
should not be employed” as a level of scrutiny for gun regulations.).
209
554 U.S. at 628 n.27 (“If all that was required to overcome the right to keep
and bear arms was a rational basis, the Second Amendment would be redundant
with the separate constitutional prohibitions on irrational laws, and would have
no effect.”).
210
Charles, supra note 181, at 27.
211
Dulan, supra note 188, at 11.
212
See supra note 202.
213
See Bagni, supra note 23, at 1539.
214
See id. at 1539–40.
215
See supra note 202 and accompanying text. It should also be noted that
regulations targeting juveniles would fall in the outermost sphere as well and

2017]

FITTING A GUN IN A CIRCLE

927

affecting a specific type of felon: the domestic violence misdemeanant.
In 1996, Congress added the Lautenberg Amendment216 to the
1996 Gun Control Act.217 This Amendment makes it illegal for any
person convicted of a felony or misdemeanor crime of domestic violence to own or possess a gun.218 The reasoning behind 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(9) is “that people who have been convicted of violence
once—toward a spouse, child, or domestic partner, no less—are
likely to use violence again.”219 Guns clearly exacerbate the problem
of domestic violence.220 In 2012, 93% of women were killed by a
male they knew, 62% of these homicides were committed by an intimate partner, and the most common weapon used was a gun.221
According to a study in the Journal of Trauma, “[m]ore than twice
as many women are killed with a gun used by their husbands or intimate acquaintances than are murdered by strangers using guns,
knives, or any other means.”222 In a survey of battered women,
trigger rational basis review. This is because of the “existence of a longstanding
tradition of prohibiting juveniles from both receiving and possessing handguns.”
United States v. Rene E., 583 F.3d 8, 12 (1st Cir. 2009); see Charles, supra note
181, at 18. Juveniles differ from adults in terms of “maturity, judgment and selfcontrol” and thus the government has an extremely strong interest in regulating
juvenile gun ownership. Lewis M. Wasserman, Gun Control on College and University Campuses in the Wake of District of Columbia v. Heller and McDonald v.
City of Chicago, 19 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 1, 53 (2011).
216
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9).
217
Sarah Lorraine Solon, Domestic Violence, 10 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 369,
388 (2009).
218
Id.
219
United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 642 (7th Cir. 2010).
220
Josh Sugarmann, For Women, Gun Violence Often Linked to Domestic Violence, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 1, 2014, 5:59 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/josh-sugarmann/for-women-gun-violence-of_b_5913752.html
(“Reducing gun violence against women goes hand in hand with reducing domestic violence.”); Dylan Matthews, 11 Facts About Gun Violence in the United
States: Guns Contribute to Domestic Violence, VOX (Dec. 10, 2015, 11:53 AM),
http://www.vox.com/cards/gun-violence-facts/guns-domestic-violence-unitedstates-risk (noting that women have a much greater risk of dying by homicide due
to domestic violence if they have access to a gun in their home).
221
Sugarmann, supra note 220.
222
Evan Defilippis, Having a Gun in the House Doesn’t Make a Woman Safer,
CITYLAB (Feb. 24, 2014), http://www.citylab.com/politics/2014/02/having-gunhouse-doesnt-make-woman-safer/8474/.
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71.4% of respondents reported that their intimate partners had used
guns these women had in their homes against them, usually threatening to kill these women.223
The court in Skoien applied intermediate scrutiny to gun regulations affecting domestic violence offenders.224 The court explained
that domestic abusers often commit acts against relatives that are
charged as misdemeanors when a similar act against a stranger
would be a felony, firearms are deadly in domestic abuse, and domestic offenders are likely to offend again and remain dangerous.225
However, rational basis should be applied to domestic violence
offenders because these individuals are not law-abiding citizens and
therefore the Second Amendment does not apply to them.226 Additionally, the Author has singled out domestic violence offenders because they pose a particularly high threat to society and have high
recidivism rates.227 The rate of re-offense by perpetrators of domestic violence is 30% to 40%.228 More importantly, there are few treatment methods that have reduced the recidivism rate of domestic violence offenders.229 Domestic violence offenders are particularly
problematic; according to a 2007 study of more than 300,000 exconvicts, “offenders with domestic violence charges were the most

223

Id. (“Indeed, gun threats in the home against women by their intimate partners appear to be more common across the United States than self-defense uses
of guns by women.”).
224
614 F.3d at 642.
225
Id. at 643–44.
226
Charles, supra note 181, at 27.
227
Skoien, 614 F.3d at 644; Jean Reynolds, Domestic Violence—Again and
Again, L. ENFORCEMENT TODAY (Nov. 14, 2013), http://www.lawenforcementtoday.com/domestic-violence%E2%80%94again-and-again/.
228
Reynolds, supra note 227.
229
Robert M. Sartin, et al., Domestic Violence Treatment Response and Recidivism: A Review and Implications for the Study of Family Violence, 11
AGGRESSION AND VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 425, 426 (2006) (“A recent meta-analysis
of 22 studies evaluating treatment efficacy found treatment for domestic violence
perpetrators to have only a small effect on post-treatment recidivism . . . .”).
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likely of any other group studied to commit another violent felony.”230 These offenders use their families as a training ground for
committing other violent felonies.231
Additionally, commentators have suggested that restricting the
bearing of arms of domestic violence misdemeanants would have
been accepted by the Founding Fathers at the time of ratification of
the Second Amendment because of the Founders’ emphasis on lawabiding citizens, implying that a low standard of scrutiny would
likely have been deemed acceptable by the Founders.232
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court established an individual right to bear arms
in the home for self-defense in District of Columbia v. Heller and
later extended this right to the states through the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment in McDonald v. City of Chicago.
However, because the Supreme Court failed to express what level
of scrutiny should be applied to challenged gun regulations in either
of these landmark cases, post-Heller and McDonald lower courts
have been left in a state of utter confusion. These courts have applied
various levels of scrutiny ranging from strict to intermediate to an
undue burden standard and some have applied a two-step hybrid test
utilizing strict and intermediate scrutiny. While most courts have
settled on applying the hybrid two-step test, this approach is not best
suited to analyzing challenged gun regulations.
First Amendment doctrine has been used to inform Second
Amendment analysis regarding why certain regulations trigger strict
scrutiny and others trigger intermediate scrutiny. Thus, further
drawing on First Amendment jurisprudence and the circle model
used in the context of church autonomy, this Comment suggests that
the circle model should be applied in analyzing Second Amendment
230

Jennifer Mascia, Domestic Abusers Often Graduate to Other Violent
Crimes. They Also Often Get to Have Guns., THE TRACE (Dec. 1, 2015), http://
www.thetrace.org/2015/12/domestic-abuse-gun-ownership-planned-parenthoodshooting/ (“Domestic violence felons experienced a recidivism rate for violent
felonies of 19 percent, compared to 13.7 percent for offenders with felony assault
convictions . . . .”).
231
Id.
232
Charles, supra note 181, at 38–39 (“[I]t is most certain that such a restriction would be deemed constitutionally permissible under the requisite low to
intermediate scrutiny standard of review.”).
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regulations. According to this model, there is an epicenter with two
concentric circles revolving around it. The core right of bearing
arms in the home for self-defense is at the epicenter of this model,
and regulations that affect this core right trigger the highest level of
scrutiny—strict scrutiny. Any regulations falling in the first circle
emanating from the epicenter trigger intermediate scrutiny and any
regulations falling in the second circle trigger rational basis. This
model provides a much more workable method of determining what
level of scrutiny to apply to a specific regulation. Additionally, the
circle model provides nuance and structure, while still allowing for
flexibility.
The circle model builds upon the idea behind Justice Breyer’s
interest-balancing approach as well as the hybrid two-part test and
the sliding-scale model. The circle model brings these other models
to their logical conclusions. While the logic behind Justice Breyer’s
interest-balancing approach is similar to the idea behind the circle
model, the circle model provides much more guidance than the interest-balancing approach by providing predictable results as well as
structure. Thus, regulations need not be analyzed according to the
free-wheeling interests of the judiciary, as the circle model provides
a comprehensive guide for where specific regulations will fall.
Moreover, compared to the two-part test and the sliding-scale
model, the circle model more accurately takes into account the understanding that the Second Amendment does not apply to felons,
but only to law-abiding citizens. Because felons are not protected by
the Second Amendment, regulations affecting them only need to be
analyzed using the lowest level of scrutiny. Thus, contrary to the
two-part test and the sliding-scale model, which apply intermediate
scrutiny to regulations affecting felons, the circle model suggests
that felons fall in the outermost circle surrounding the core, applying
rational basis review to regulations affecting them.
Law-abiding citizens that do not have a mental illness fall within
the epicenter of the circle, individuals with mental illness fall in the
first circle emanating from the epicenter, and felons fall in the outermost circle emanating from the epicenter. While some may disagree
with the application of the circle model and the placement of specific individuals within the model, the approach itself is still applicable. Individuals who disagree may place specific individuals
where they see fit in the circle model. This model provides a much
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more comprehensive guide than the other models currently used to
analyze Second Amendment challenges.

